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 [Abstract] This paper discusses the financial dynamics of the airline industry by 
identifying the fundamental cycle periods of profitability and their driving factors. 
Assuming the industry profit cycles could be modeled as an undamped second-order system, 
the fundamental cycle period was found to be 11.3 years for the U.S. airline industry and 
10.5 years for the world airline industry. An empirical profitability model was estimated and 
the results revealed that such cycle period is endogenous, neither deregulation nor 
September 11 have significantly changed the cycle length. To analyze the causes of profit 
cyclicality, parametric models were developed under the hypothesis that phase lag in the 
system caused the profit oscillations; and two hypotheses, lag in capacity response and lag in 
cost adjustment were studied. Analysis of the parametric model of capacity response 
indicated that the system stability depends on the delay between aircraft orders and 
deliveries and on the aggressiveness in airplane ordering. Exaggerated capacity response 
was observed in the simulation as the gain in the model has lumped impacts of exogenous 
factors, suggesting capacity shortfall alone cannot fully explain the industry dynamics. The 
model also indicates reducing delay may help to mitigate system oscillations. Simulation 
results of the parametric model regarding cost adjustment were consistent with profit 
observations. Finally, a coupled model was developed to study the joint effects of capacity 
and cost. Simulation results indicated that the coupled model explained industry dynamics 
better than individual capacity or cost models, suggesting that the system behavior is driven 
by the joint effects of capacity response and cost adjustment. 
Nomenclature 
T = fundamental cycle period of the profitability of the airline industry 
τ = e-folding time indicating how rapidly the amplitude grows  
t = time 
t0 = time instant the system crosses zero 
A = amplitude of profit oscillation 
x(t) = industry profit or loss in billions of constant 2000 dollars 
C0 = intercept  
K = control gain in the capacity/cost parametric model 
D = delay in the capacity/cost parametric model 
ωcrit = critical frequency at which the system oscillates with constant amplitude 
Tcrit = critical cycle period corresponding to ωcrit
Kcrit = critical gain corresponding to ωcrit  
I. Introduction 
HE air transportation in the United States has experienced rapid development through boom-and-bust cycles, 
particularly since deregulation in 1978. Prior to 1978, the airline industry resembled a public utility; the routes 
each airline flew and the fares they charged were regulated by the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB)1. As the Airline 
Deregulation Act eliminated CAB’s authority over routes and domestic fares, the airline industry transformed into a 
market-oriented sector, driven by the dynamics between demand and supply. 
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Deregulation has promoted the development of air transportation system; as shown in Fig. 1 the rapid growth in 
traffic and operating capacity, measured by Revenue Passenger Miles (RPM) and Available Seat Miles (ASM) 
respectively2. The annual growth of domestic scheduled traffic of the U.S. airlines between 1978 and 2002 averaged 
11.7 million RPMs per year, more than doubled the average growth between 1954 and 1978 that was 5.8 million 
RPMs per year3, and the operating capacity of the industry grew on average 4% per year between 1980 and 2000. 
Despite the rapid growth, the net financial results of the industry exhibited a significantly different behavior. The 
annual operating revenues and expenses4 of the U.S. major, national and regional passenger and cargo airlines have 
grown with traffic (Fig. 2), whereas the industry profits4 (Fig. 3) have oscillated around zero with growing 
amplitude, suggesting that fundamental changes took place in the industry since deregulation. In recent down cycle, 
the industry has lost over 23 billion dollars accumulatively in 2001, 2002 and 2003, outpacing the total earnings of 
the past. Many airlines have suffered intense financial losses. In past five years, major airlines, such as United 
Airlines, US Airways, ATA Airlines, Northwest Airlines, and Delta Air Lines, have filed bankruptcy protection. By 
contrast, the industry was profitable most of the time before deregulation even in the down cycles (Fig. 3).  It should 
be noted that data in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 were evaluated in constant 2000 dollars to eliminate the inflation effects. 
Unless otherwise noted, all financial data in this study is referred to 2000 dollars. 
 The above observation of growing profit oscillations after deregulation could not be simply explained by traffic 
or capacity growth. Shown in Fig. 4 are the unit profits of the industry since deregulation. The unit profit was 
derived from normalizing the net profit with respect to ASM of the year to eliminate the effect of capacity increase 
on profit growth. Again, the amplitude of oscillating unit profits has grown over the cycles since deregulation. 
Moreover, similar observation is also seen in the world airline industry. As the wave of liberalizing air 
transportation spreads globally, the world air traffic and capacity have grown rapidly since the late 1970s. Shown in 
Fig. 5 are the annual traffic (RPK) and operating capacity (ASK) of the world airlines recorded by ICAO5. The 
annual growth rate of capacity averaged 4.7% during the 1980s and 1990s. On the other hand, the net profits of the 
 
Figure 1. Annual Traffic and Capacity of 
Scheduled Services of the U.S. Airline Industry2. 
 
Figure 2. Annual Operating Revenues and 
Expenses of All Services of the U.S. Airline 
Industry4. 
 
Figure 3. Annual Net Profits of All Services of the 
U.S. Airline Industry4. 
 
Figure 4. Unit Net Profits of the U.S. Airline 
Industry. 
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world airlines again have oscillated with increasing amplitude over the years since the late 1970s (Fig. 6)5. 
Although the cyclical behavior of the airline industry has been widely noticed by industry professionals and 
external financial investors, majority of the researches focused on the dynamics between orders and deliveries of 
commercial jets6, 7, with little on the fundamental cycle period of industry profitability and its causes. The financial 
crisis facing the U.S. airlines in 2001-2003 has highlighted the volatility and oscillation of industry profits as a key 
issue for the stability of airline industry. The objective of this study is to understand the dynamics of airline industry 
by identifying the fundamental cycle periods of industry profitability as well as the driving factors. 
 The study took a system approach to analyze the profitability of airline industry. Assuming the oscillating 
profits resemble an undamped second-order system, a spectrum analysis was conducted to identify the fundamental 
cycle periods, followed by the estimation of empirical profitability models of the U.S. and world airline industries. 
To explore the causes of profit cyclicality, parametric models were developed under the hypothesis that phase lag in 
the system causes profit oscillations; and two hypotheses, lag in capacity response and lag in cost adjustment were 
examined first separately and later jointly. A root locus analysis was performed to explain the system stability and 
simulations were executed to verify the hypotheses. Last, a coupled model was developed to assess the joint effects 
of capacity response and cost adjustment. 
 
Figure 5. Annual Traffic and Capacity of the 
World Airline Industry5. 
 
Figure 6. Annual Net Profits of the World Airline 
Industry5. 
II. Fundamental Cycle Periods and Empirical Models of the Profitability of Airline Industries  
A. Fundamental Cycle Periods of the Profitability of Airline Industries  
Signal detection approach was used to identify the fundamental cycle period T of the profitability of airline 
industry. Viewing historical profit data of airline industry as a set of noisy signals containing information about the 
system characteristics, Discrete Fourier transform (DFT) was applied to the profit data to identify the fundamental 
frequency of the system. Detailed discussion of DFT analysis can be found in Ref. 8 on pages 24-25.  
Annual profit data of the U.S. airlines between 1980 and 2002 were analyzed, and the fundamental frequency of 
the profitability of the U.S. airline industry was found to be 0.0938/year (Fig. 7). Seen in the figure, the magnitude 
of the fundamental frequency is about 6dB higher than that of the second frequency, meaning that the magnitude of 
the fundamental frequency is approximately twice of that of the second frequency. The corresponding fundamental 
cycle period is therefore 10.7 years, the reciprocal of the fundamental frequency. 
Similarly, annual profit data of the world airline industry between 1978 and 2002 were analyzed, and the 
fundamental frequency of the world airlines was found to be 0.099/year. Again, the magnitude is about 6dB higher 
or in other words twice stronger than that of the second frequency. Correspondingly, the fundamental cycle period of 
the profitability of the world airline industry is 10.1 years. 
B. Hypothesis and Estimation of Empirical Profitability Models of Airline Industries 
The profit oscillations of the U.S. airline industry since deregulation resembled an undamped second-order 
system (Fig. 3). Assuming the profitability of airline industry can be modeled as an undamped second-order system, 
the general form of the profitability model is 
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Figure 7. Discrete Fourier Transform of Annual 
Profits of the U.S. Airline Industry in 1980-2002. 
 
Figure 8. Discrete Fourier Transform of Annual 
Profits of the World Airline Industry in 1978-2002. 
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where x(t) is the industry profit or loss measured in billions of constant 2000 dollars; T is the fundamental cycle 
period of profitability of airline industry; τ is the e-folding time indicating how rapidly the amplitude grows; t is the 
chronicle year; t0 is the time instant the system crosses zero; and A is the amplitude of profit oscillation. Detailed 
derivation of Eq. (1) can be found in Chapter 2 of Ref. 8, pages 23-27. 
Nonlinear least square regression was employed to estimate the net profit model specified in Eq. (1) from 
industry profit data. The profit data were evaluated in constant 2000 dollars in regression and the best estimation 
was obtained through iterations. The fundamental cycle periods identified by DFT analysis were served as initial 
values of T in Eq. (1) for the U.S. and world airline industries respectively to initiate the iteration and assure the 
solution convergence. 
C. Profitability Model of the U.S. Airline Industry before Deregulation 
To represent the fact that the U.S. airline industry was profitable most of the time before deregulation (Fig. 3), 
the general profitability model in Eq. (1) was modified by adding an intercept. Further, since the profits exhibited 
nearly steady oscillating amplitude before deregulation, the exponential term was removed from Eq. (1) by assuming 
the e-folding time approximates infinity. Consequently, the modified profitability model is proposed below  
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where C0 is the intercept. 
Annual net profit data4 of the U.S. airline industry between 1960 and 1979 were used to estimate the parameters 
in above equation. The estimate of profitability model of the U.S. airline industry before deregulation is provided in 
Eq. (3). The correlation coefficient is 0.59. The best-fit results of the profitability model in Eq. (3) are compared 
with the input data (net profits in 1960-1979) shown as yellow bars in Fig. 9. The model further forecast the 
profitability in subsequent decade. The projections are compared with respect to the industry net profits between 
1980 and 1990, shown as gray bars in Fig. 9. 
 ( ) 904.0
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D. Profitability Model of the U.S. Airline Industry after Deregulation 
Annual net profits4 of the U.S. airline industry between 1980 and 2002 were used to estimate the profitability 
model of the industry after deregulation. The model was last estimated in 2004 and the result is provided in Eq. (4). 
The correlation coefficient is 0.88. Figure 10 compares the best-fit results and projections of the model with respect 
to the industry net profits in 1978-2004. 
  
( ) ( ) ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−=
−
3.11
4.19772sin550.0)( 86.7
4.1977 tetx
t π  (4) 
1. Impact of Deregulation on the Profitability of the U.S. Airline Industry 
Deregulation in 1978 had a profound influence on the U.S. airline industry. Comparison of above two models 
indicates that deregulation changed the e-folding time significantly. The pre-deregulation model in Eq. (3) implies 
an infinite e-folding time, while this parameter becomes finite in Eq. (4) for post-deregulation circumstance. As a 
result, dramatically different behavior was witnessed before and after deregulation. Figure 9 illustrates an oscillation 
with constant amplitude whereas Figure 10 projects the industry profit to oscillate with increasing amplitude. 
Moreover, the oscillation amplitudes differ in magnitude as well. The amplitude of profit oscillation before 
deregulation is approximately 1 billion dollars, much lower than the amplitude in post-deregulation case (Fig. 10). 
However, comparisons of the two models reveal that the fundamental cycle periods before and after deregulation 
were almost identical, approximately 11 years. This suggests that although deregulation had a strong influence on 
the oscillation amplitude, it did not change the fundamental profit cycle period of the U.S. airline industry. 
 
Figure 9. Comparison of Best-fit Results and 
Projections of Profitability Model of the U.S. Airline 
Industry before Deregulation with Respect to 
Industry Net Profits in 1960-1990. 
 
Figure 10. Comparison of Best-fit Results and 
Projections of Profitability Model of the U.S. Airline 
Industry after Deregulation with Respect to 
Industry Net Profits in 1978-2004. 
2. Impact of September 11 on the Profitability of the U.S. Airline Industry 
The September 11 terrorist attack had severely affected the air transportation system in the United States. To 
evaluate its impact on profit cyclicality, the profitability model was estimated again in Eq. (5) using the net profit 
data between 1980 and 2000. The correlation coefficient is 0.83. The best-fit results of the model as well as future 
projections are shown in Fig. 11 in comparison with industry profit outcomes till 2004. 
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As seen from Fig. 11, the profit cyclicality is not highly dependent on the September 11 event. Comparison of 
amplitudes in Fig. 10 and Fig. 11 indicate that the event exacerbated the profit oscillation. However, close 
examination of Eq. (3) through Eq. (5) shows that the fundamental cycle period T of industry profitability did not 
vary significantly. 
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E. Profitability Model of the World Airline Industry 
Following the same methodology, profit data between 1978 and 2002 from ICAO5, evaluated in constant 2000 
U.S. dollars, were used to estimate the profitability model of the world airline industry. The model was last 
estimated in 2004 and the result is presented in Eq. (6). The correlation coefficient is 0.84. Figure 12 shows the best-
fit results of the model and projections in comparison with profits of the world airlines between 1978 and 2003. 
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Figure 11. Comparison of Best-fit Results and 
Projections of Profitability Model of the U.S. Airline 
Industry after Deregulation with Data Only before 
2001. 
 
Figure 12. Comparison of Best-fit Results and 
Projections of Profitability Model of the World 
Airline Industry with Profit Data in 1978-2003. 
F. Assumptions and Limitations of Empirical Profitability Models 
It is worth to note that although the profitability models estimated above have obtained reasonably good 
correlation with historical profit data, above empirical models are not able to address causality and/or future 
constraints. It is clear that future industry growth will be limited at some point, probably by capital investment as the 
industry becomes less-appealing to investors due to losses in the down cycle, and/or by capacity and traffic demand 
as the system reaches the limit of the national aerospace system in the up cycle. Caution must be taken in applying 
these models to predict future system behavior and interpreting the projection results. Nevertheless, these models 
offer insight on the profit cyclicality of airline industries. 
III. Parametric Model for Capacity 
It is known that the presence of phase lag or delay in a control system causes oscillations and tends to make the 
system less stable. Two potential sources of phase lag were observed through extensive data examination: (1) lag 
between capacity response and profits, and (2) lag between cost adjustment and profits. This section analyzes the 
relationship between capacity and profitability, and discusses a parametric model based on the capacity hypothesis. 
The impact of lag between cost adjustment and profitability will be discussed in the next section. 
A. Data Analysis of World Commercial Jet Orders and Deliveries 
The relationship between industry profitability and world commercial jet orders and deliveries is illustrated in 
Fig. 13 through Fig. 15. Figure 13 depicts the world commercial jet airplane orders and deliveries to scheduled 
passenger and cargo airlines operating worldwide as recorded by ICAO5; approximately a two-year time shift can be 
observed between aircraft orders and deliveries. Figure 14 describes the relationship between world aircraft 
deliveries and net profits; a delay of approximately three years is observed between delivery peaks and profit peaks.  
To assess the average delay, annual deliveries were further regressed with respect to annual profits and traffic 
(RPK) with several years of delay assumed. As shown in Eq. (7), the delivery in year t has the best correlation when 
average three years of delay was assumed for RPK and profit. The correlation coefficient is 0.90. 
 Deliveryt = 87 + 0.29 RPKt-3 + 0.027 Profitt-3 (7) 
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where RPK is in billions, profit in billions of dollars and Delivery in aircraft units. The regression results are shown 
in Fig. 14 for comparison. 
In addition to the delay observation, an asymmetric effect was found between world aircraft orders and net 
profits. Figure 15 shows that the world annual aircraft orders either grow with the profits of prior year when the 
industry is profitable or follow a flat trend otherwise. A first-order approximation of this asymmetric effect indicates 
that the slope of aircraft orders with respect to the prior-year profits averages about 147 airplane orders per year for 
each billion dollars of profits, whereas the flat trend is about 350 airplane orders per year regardless of the 
magnitude of losses.  
 
Figure 14. World Aircraft Deliveries and World 
Airline Net Profits5. 
 
Figure 13. World Commercial Jet Aircraft 
Orders and Deliveries5. 
 
Figure 16. Block Diagram of Parametric Model 
for Capacity. 
 
Figure 15. Asymmetric Effect between World 
Aircraft Orders and World Airlines Net Profits. 
B. Capacity Hypothesis and Parametric Model for Capacity 
The existence of phase lag or delay will cause the 
system to oscillate. From above data analysis, 
approximately 3-year delay was observed between 
aircraft deliveries and profitability of the world airline 
industry. The capacity hypothesis was that the phase lag 
in capacity response caused the oscillation in profits of 
airline industry.  
A parametric model was developed based on the 
capacity hypothesis and the block diagram is shown in 
Fig. 16. The output of the model is the capacity offered 
by the system that has units of available seat-miles 
(ASM). The input of the model is the demand, i.e., 
desired capacity, which also has units of available seat-
miles. The difference between the demand and the 
capacity is capacity shortfall, which again has units of 
available seat-miles. Airlines order airplanes based on 
the capacity shortfall and their ordering strategies. The 
control gain K in the model represents the overall 
aggressiveness in the ordering process, and has units of 
ASM ordered per year per unit ASM shortfall. The delay 
D represents the lag between capacity shortfall and 
deliveries in the system and has units as years. 
Assuming airlines’ pricing activity is based on capacity 
shortfall, capacity shortfall is correlated with profits 
through constant C, and the delay D also represents the 
lag between profits and deliveries. Because of the delay, 
the new deliveries will not be added into the total 
capacity until D years later. The closed-loop transfer 
function of the capacity parametric model is 
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C. Stability of Parametric Model for Capacity 
1. Root-Locus Analysis of System Stability 
A root-locus analysis was performed to analyze the stability of the capacity parametric model and the main 
branch of the root-locus is shown in Fig. 17. The critical point, the point where the main branch of the root-locus 
crosses the imaginary axis, holds the relationship presented in Eq. (9).  
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where ωcrit is the critical frequency at which the system oscillates with constant amplitude, Τcrit is the critical cycle 
period and Κcrit is the critical gain corresponding to ωcrit respectively. 
The relationship between the system stability and the values of delay and gain implied by the root-locust analysis 
is better illustrated in Fig. 18. The line in the figure indicates the boundary that maintains the system stability. 
Systems on the boundary will just oscillate with constant amplitude and hold the relationship described in Eq. (9). 
Shown in Fig. 17, the system will become unstable when its poles cross over the imaginary axis and enter into the 
right-hand side of s-plane, i.e., when ω > ωcrit and/or Κ > Κcrit. This corresponds to the area in Fig. 18 that is above 
the stability boundary. Systems in this area will oscillate exponentially. The area below the stability boundary 
represents the stable region and corresponds to the left-hand side of s-plane in Fig. 17.  
Therefore, the system stability is dependent on the delay and gain values and its location on the map in Fig. 18. 
To understand the profit stability of airline industry, it is necessary to determine the parameters that represent the 
U.S. and world airline industries and locate them on the map. 
 
2. Determining Parameters in Parametric Model for Capacity 
In order to use profit data to calculate the delay and gain values in the capacity parametric model, it is necessary 
to relate profits to capacity shortfall. A linear relationship was assumed in Eq. (10) that the aggregate industry 
profits are proportional to the capacity shortfall (Fig. 16).  
 Profit = C (Demand – Capacity) (10) 
Such assumption implies that profit has the same chara  
has the same oscillation frequency and damping ratio as 
capacity shortfall. Therefore, it enables ones to use the 
fundamental cycle period T and e-folding time τ 
estimated in the previous section to calculate the delay 
and gain values from Eq. (11) below. Detailed 
 
Figure 17. Main Branch of the Root-Locus of 
Parametric Model for Capacity. 
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Figure 18. System Stability and Delay and Gain 
Values in Parametric Model for Capacity of the 
U.S. and World Airline Industries. 
cteristic equation as capacity shortfall, and consequentlynautics and Astronautics 
derivations can be found in Chapter 4 of Ref. 8 on pages 42-45. 
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Using Eq. (11), the delay and gain values for the U.S. and world airlines were computed from the e-folding time 
τ and fundamental cycle period T that were estimated previously. The results are summarized in Table 1, including 
the critical gain that is calculated with respect to delay using Eq. (9). The delay and gain values of the U.S. and 
world airline industries are also plotted in Fig. 18. 
Seen from the table, the computed delay for the world airline industry is 2.8 years. This is consistent with the 
observed average 3-year delay between the profits of the world airline industry and airplane deliveries. The 
consistency indicates that capacity could influence profits. The gain for the world airline industry is 0.73 annual 
ASM ordered per ASM shortfall, that is, 73% of capacity shortfall is fulfilled annually. The gain is about 30% larger 
than the critical value. Similarly, the computed delays for the U.S. airlines before and after deregulation are 
consistent or close to the observed average 3-year delay for world airplane deliveries. However, the gain for the U.S. 
airline industry after deregulation is approximately twice the critical gain. By contrast, the computed gain for the 
U.S. airline industry before deregulation is equal to the critical value, representing a system that oscillates with 
constant amplitude. As seen from Fig. 18, the point representing the U.S. airline industry before deregulation is 
located right on the stability boundary, whereas the points for the U.S. airline industry post deregulation and the 
world airline industry all fall in the unstable region. Moreover, the point representing the U.S. airline industry post 
deregulation is positioned further from the stability boundary than that for the world airline industry, indicating it’s 
more unstable than the latter. 
Table 1. Delay and Gain Estimates in the Parametric Model for Capacity  
of the U.S. and World Airline Industry. 
T τ  D K Kcrit
Airline Industry 
Year ( )shortfall ASMorder/year ASM  
World  10.5 14.9 2.8 0.73 0.56 
U.S. before Deregulation 11.2 ∞ 2.8 0.56 0.56 
U.S. after Deregulation 11.3 7.86 3.2 0.86 0.49 
 
3. Factors Contributing to Delay and Gain Values in Parametric Model for Capacity 
The delay in the airline industry primarily consists of the decision time in placing orders, order processing time 
and manufacturing lead-time.  
Factors contributing to the high gains may include: 
• Optimism in total capacity projection that amplifies the capacity shortfall; 
• Collective market share perspective is greater than 100%. The collective market share perspective represents 
the aggregate effect of individual airlines’ projections in market share. For individual airlines, the 
management usually makes fleet plans based on the market share and traffic projections. Consequently, the 
collective market share perspective in each competing O-D market and in total capacity could easily exceed 
100%, resulting over-capacity at industry-level; 
• Aggressiveness when the manufacturers pursue orders. This can happen when a manufacturer offers special 
deals to particular airlines or markets for the sake of market penetration and/or the market share of the 
manufacturer; 
• Exogenous factors. Because of the simplicity of the parametric model, the gain has lumped impacts of 
exogenous factors, such as, the positive impact of high GDP growth on traffic and the negative impact of 
economic recession and/or war on demand, as well as the influence of fuel price fluctuations on profits. 
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D. Simulation of Parametric Model for Capacity of Airline Industries 
1. Simulation of Capacity of the U.S. Airline Industry 
The capacity of the U.S. airline industry was simulated by running the capacity parametric model (Fig. 16) with 
delay and gain values from the U.S. post-deregulation condition (Table 1). The input demand was assumed to grow 
at 4% per year, the average ASM growth rate of the U.S. airline industry since deregulation (Fig. 1). The simulation 
starting time was 1980 when the industry profit was near zero, implying certain equilibrium achieved between 
demand and supply. 
Figure 19 shows the simulation results of demand and capacity in comparison with ATA capacity data. Figure 20 
shows the results of capacity shortfall plus industry net profits to illustrate the relationship between capacity 
shortfall and profits. Seen from Fig. 20, according to the simple capacity parametric model, the industry was 
approximately 550 billion ASMs under-capacity in 1998 whereas approximately 1,000 billion ASMs over-capacity 
in 2003; the capacity shortfall has grown through the cycles. The exponentially oscillating behavior in capacity 
shortfall is generally consistent with industry profits. However, the capacity simulation in Fig. 19 overshoots the 
observed variation in capacity data. This indicates that capacity shortfall alone is not sufficient to explain industry 
profit oscillations. 
 As discussed before, aggregate industry profits were related to capacity shortfall in order to determine the delay 
and gain values in the parametric model. If the behavior were solely due to capacity shortfall, constant C in Eq. (10) 
would have the implication of cost or incentive for adding or removing additional capacity. From the simulations 
results in Fig. 20, constant C can be estimated by regressing the profit data with respect to capacity shortfall via 
least-square. The value of constant C was found to be approximate 1 cent (2000$) per ASM in capacity shortfall, 
implying that the cost or incentive for adding or removing one available seat-mile to fulfill the capacity shortfall will 
lead to approximately one cent (2000$) in loss or profit. It should be pointed out that such estimation is preliminary 
given the simplicity of the model; however, it illustrates the potential interaction between capacity and profit. 
 
Figure 19. Simulation of Demand and Capacity 
of the Capacity Parametric Model of the U.S. 
Airline Industry.
 
Figure 20. Simulation of Capacity Shortfall of the 
Capacity Parametric Model of the U.S. Airline 
Industry.
2. Simulation of Capacity of the World Airline Industry  
The capacity of the world airline industry was also simulated by setting the delay and gain in the parametric 
model to the values for the world airlines in Table 1. The demand growth rate was assumed to be 4.7%, the average 
worldwide ASK growth rate (Fig. 5). Again the simulation starting time was 1980. 
Simulation results of demand and capacity of the world airlines are shown in Fig. 21 in comparison with ICAO 
capacity data. The model also simulates the aircraft orders in terms of ASMs, as shown in the block diagram (Fig. 
16). In order to compare the results with historical airplane order data, simulated aircraft orders in ASMs were 
converted to aircraft unit orders by dividing the average aircraft utility. The average aircraft utility of the U.S. 
airlines, that was 190 million ASMs per aircraft per year as discussed in Appendix A of Ref. 8, was used in the 
conversion. The converted order simulations are shown in Fig. 22, in comparison with the world airplane order data 
from ICAO and the baseline order that was 350 aircraft per year shown in Fig. 15. Again, the capacity simulation in 
Figure 21 overshoots the observed variation in capacity data. Seen from Figure 22, the simulation of orders is 
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generally consistent with world aircraft orders. The average of the simulation results is above zero, partially 
reflecting the asymmetric effect between profitability and aircraft orders shown in Fig. 15.  
 
Figure 21. Simulation of Demand and Capacity 
of the Capacity Parametric Model of the World 
Airline Industry.
 
Figure 22. Simulation of Capacity Shortfall of the 
Capacity Parametric Model of the World Airline 
Industry. 
E. Mitigating System Oscillations 
The parametric capacity model was also used to explore potential ways to mitigate system oscillations. The 
stability relationship shown in Fig. 18 suggests that the system could be stabilized by reducing delay and gain below 
the stability boundary. As an illustration, simulations were performed with different delays while holding the gains 
unchanged, and results of different delay values are shown in Fig. 23 for the U.S. airline industry and in Fig. 24 for 
the world airline industry. The results indicate that if the gain is held unchanged, the capacity of the U.S. airline 
industry would become stabilized if the delay were reduced from 3.2 years to 1.8 years. Similarly, the world 
capacity would stabilize if the delay were reduced from 2.8 year to 2.2 years. 
 
Figure 23. Mitigating Capacity Oscillations of the 
Capacity Parametric Model of the U.S. Airline 
Industry.
 
Figure 24. Mitigating Capacity Oscillations of the 
Capacity Parametric Model of the World Airline 
Industry.
IV. Parametric Model for Cost 
A. Unit Net Profit Analysis 
Assuming the unit net profits of the U.S. airline industry after deregulation (Fig. 4) resembled an undamped 
second-order system, the unit net profit model of the industry was estimated in Eq. (12) using the unit net profit data 
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between 1980 and 2002. The correlation coefficient is 0.85. Figure 25 shows the best-fit results and projections of 
the model in comparison with industry unit net profits through 2003. 
 ( ) ( ) ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−=
−
2.11
6.19772sin110.0)( 78.9
6.1977 tetu
t π  (12) 
where u(t) is in cent/ASM in constant 2000 dollars.  
 
Figure 25. Best-fit Results and Projections of the 
Unit Net Profit Model of the U.S. Airline Industry 
after Deregulation in Comparison with Unit Profit 
Data through 2003.
B. Cost Hypothesis and Parametric Model for Cost 
1. Cost Hypothesis 
Figure 26 depicts the RASM (passenger revenue per 
ASM) and CASM (operating expense per ASM) of the 
U.S. major and national passenger carriers recorded by 
DOT9 and ATA10, where, CASM has been adjusted with 
respect to passenger services based on ATA Airline Cost 
Index10. The methodology of cost adjustment is 
provided in Appendix B of Ref. 8. Seen from Fig. 26, 
RASM has decreased on average 1.7% per year between 
1980 and 2000, while CASM has decreased at 2% 
annually. The fluctuations in RASM were followed by 
the fluctuations in CASM with about one year delay. 
RASM dropped significantly by about 1.3 cent or 14% 
in 2001 because of the industry crisis then. 
Correspondingly, CASM dropped by 1 cent or 10% in 
2003 from 2001 level. 
Figure 27 shows the unit operating expenses and unit net profits of all U.S. airlines after deregulation. 
Comparing to Fig. 26, a delay of approximately three years is observed between the peaks of unit operating 
expenses and the peaks of unit net profits as well as between the troughs of these two variables. 
The cost hypothesis was that the phase lag between cost adjustment and profits caused system oscillation. 
 
Figure 27. Unit Operating Expenses and Unit Net 
Profits of the U.S. Airline Industry.
 
Figure 26. RASM and CASM of the U.S. Major 
and National Passenger Carriers9, 10.
2. Parametric Model for Cost 
A parametric model was developed based on the cost 
delay hypothesis with the block diagram shown in Fig. 
28. According to Appendix B of Ref. 8, CASM was 
separated into two components: CASM1 – profit-
sensitive component and CASM2 – less profit-sensitive 
part. The system has two inputs: RASM and CASM1; 
both having long-term decreasing trends (Fig. 26). The 
difference between RASM and CASM gives the output 
– profit per ASM (PASM). Based on PASM, cost 
 
Figure 28. Block Diagram of Parametric Model 
for Cost.
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adjustment is made due to labor contract negotiation, the competition need, etc. However, because of the delays in 
the system such as contract negotiation time, the cost adjustment will not take effect immediately but D years later. 
The control gain K in the model represents the effect of PASM on cost adjustment and has the units of cent/ASM 
cost adjustment per year per unit cent/ASM profit. The closed-loop transfer function with respect to RASM is 
 
Ke
sH
Ds−+
=
1
1)(  (13) 
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Table 2. Delay and Gain Estimates in Parametric Model for Cost of the U.S. Airline Industry.
T τ D K Kcrit
Airline Industry 
Year ( )profit Cent/ASMcost/year Cent/ASM  
U.S. after Deregulation 11.2 9.78 3.1 0.78 0.50 mparing Eq. (8) and Eq. (13), one can see the two 
tric models share the same characteristic 
n. Therefore, Equation (11) was able to be used 
to obtain the delay and gain values in the cost 
tric model that are summarized in Table 2 and 
. Figure 29 shows that the U.S. airline industry 
eregulation again falls in the unstable region 
 
Figure 29. System Stability and Delay/Gain 
Values in the Cost Parametric Model of the U.S. 
Airline Industry after Deregulation.
ulation of Parametric Model for Cost 
ulations of the cost parametric model were 
 out by running the model with the delay and gain 
 determined above. The model was calibrated with 
t profits of the U.S. airline industry in 1980-2000, 
ng RASM and CASM decreasing at 1.7% and 2% 
ar respectively. Results of calibration simulation 
own in Figure 30 and 31 in comparison with 
cal data. 
ure 32 and 33 summarize another simulation, in 
 RASM was further subject to a 14% step decrease in 2001 to simulate the industry crisis in 2001. Seen from 
, the exponentially oscillating behavior in PASM is consistent with industry unit net profits. 
erall, the simulation results indicated that the cost parametric model captures the system behavior reasonably 
he model identified cost adjustment is another potential driving factor of the system behavior, in additional to 
acity response factor. 
 
 30. Simulation of Cost/ASM of the Cost 
etric Model of the U.S. Airline Industry.
 
Figure 31. Simulation of Profit/ASM of the Cost 
Parametric Model of the U.S. Airline Industry. 
 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
 
13
 
Figure 32. Simulation of Cost/ASM of the Cost 
Parametric Model of the U.S. Airline Industry with 
Step RASM Decrease in 2001. 
 
Figure 33. Simulation of Profit/ASM of the Cost 
Parametric Model of the U.S. Airline Industry with 
Step RASM Decrease in 2001. 
V. Coupling Capacity and Cost Effects 
 
Figure 34. Block Diagram of the Coupled Model 
Combining Capacity and Cost Effects 
A. Coupled Model Combining Capacity and Cost Effects 
Shown in Fig. 34 is the coupled model that 
combines capacity and cost effects. The model 
was formed primarily by joining the capacity 
model in Fig. 16 and the cost model in Fig. 28. 
The output of the model is the total profit, the 
product of capacity and unit profit (PASM). 
The capacity and cost effects are coupled 
through two feedbacks from the profit: one fed 
to the order aggressiveness K1 and the other to 
the profit-sensitive part of CASM. Following 
the process described in Chapter 7 of Ref. 8, 
the model was calibrated with respect to the 
historical capacity, profit, PASM and CASM 
data of the U.S. airline industry between 1980 
and 2000, with results summarized in Table 3. 
B. Simulation Results 
Figures 35 through 39 depict the simulation results of the calibrated model of the U.S. airline industry in terms of 
capacity, fleet size, CASM, profit, and aircraft orders. The simulation assumed ASMs growing at 4%, RASM 
decreasing at 1.7% and CASM1 decreasing 2% per year respectively, i.e., each of them evolving along its respective 
trend shown in Fig. 1 and Fig. 26. The simulation of the U.S. fleet (Fig. 36) was obtained by dividing the capacity 
by the average aircraft utility of the U.S. airline industry (190 million ASMs per aircraft per year8). Figure 39 
compares the simulation of U.S. aircraft orders with 35% of world aircraft orders. The 35% is roughly the share of 
U.S. orders of world total according to the Boeing Current Market Outlook 200311. To verify the reasonableness of 
parameter estimates, particularly the value of K2, the assumed U.S. orders (35% of world orders) are further plotted 
against prior-year profits in Fig. 40 as well as the simulation results. The figure shows that when the airlines are 
profitable, the slope of simulated aircraft orders with respect to the profits is in the neighborhood of the observed 
slope from actual data shown in Fig. 15, suggesting the estimate of K2 – effect of profitability on order 
aggressiveness is reasonable.  
Overall, as can be seen from the figures, the coupled model interprets the industry dynamics reasonably well in 
terms of capacity growth, fleet size, CASM, profitability, and the effect of profitability on airplane orders. The 
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coupled model explains industry dynamics better than individual capacity or cost parametric models, suggesting that 
the system behavior is driven by the joint effects of capacity response and cost adjustment. 
Param
D1
D2
D3
K0
K1
K2
K3
Figure 35.
Model of t
Figure 37.
Model of tTable 3. Summary of Parameters in the Coupled Model of the U.S. Airline Industry. 
eter Description Value 
Delay between orders and deliveries 2.2      years 
Delay between profits and profit-driven orders 1         years 
Delay between profits and cost adjustment 3.1      years 
Baseline order aggressiveness 0.86   
shortall ASM
order/year ASM
 
Overall order aggressiveness K1 = K0 + K2(Profitt-D2) 
Order aggressiveness due to profitability 0.05   profit $Billion 
shortall ASM
order/year ASM
 
Effect of total profits on cost adjustment 0.11   
cost/year Cent/ASM  
profit $Billion 
 
 Simulation of Capacity of the Coupled 
he U.S. Airline Industry. 
 
Figure 36. Simulation of Fleet of the Coupled 
Model of the U.S. Airline Industry. 
 
 Simulation of CASM of the Coupled 
he U.S. Airline Industry. 
 
Figure 38. Simulation of Profitability of the 
Coupled Model of the U.S. Airline Industry. 
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Figure 39. Simulation of Aircraft Orders of the 
Coupled Model of the U.S. Airline Industry. 
 
Figure 40. Simulation of Effect of Profitability on 
Aircraft Orders of the U.S. Airline Industry. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
This paper discusses the financial dynamics of the airline industry by identifying the fundamental cycle periods 
of profitability and their driving factors. Assuming the industry profit cycles could be modeled as an undamped 
system, the fundamental cycle period was found to be 11.3 years for the U.S. airline industry and 10.5 years for the 
world airline industry. An empirical profitability model was last estimated based on the fundamental cycle period, 
and the results revealed that such cycle period is endogenous. Deregulation did not change the cycle period however 
had a strong influence on the oscillation amplitude. Similarly, exogenous shocks like the September 11 terrorist 
attack exacerbated the industry profitability but did not significantly change the profit cycle period. Although the 
empirical models offer insights on profit cyclicality of airline industry, it does not address causality and/or 
constraints where the industry growth will likely reach in the future. Therefore, care must be taken in applying the 
models to predict future system behavior 
To analyze the causes of profit cyclicality, parametric models were developed under the hypothesis that phase 
lag in the system caused the profit oscillations; and two hypotheses, lag in capacity response and lag in cost 
adjustment were studied. Analysis of the parametric model of capacity response indicated that the system stability 
depends on the delay between aircraft orders and deliveries and the aggressiveness in airplane ordering. Exaggerated 
capacity response was observed in the simulation as the gain in the model has lumped impacts of exogenous factors, 
suggesting capacity shortfall alone cannot fully explain the industry dynamics. The model also indicates reducing 
delay may help to mitigate system oscillations. Simulation results of the parametric model regarding cost adjustment 
were consistent with profit observations. Finally, a coupled model was developed to study the joint effects of 
capacity and cost. Simulation results indicated that the coupled model explained industry dynamics better than 
individual capacity or cost models, suggesting that the dynamics of the industry is driven by the joint effects of 
capacity response and cost adjustment. 
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